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CASE REFUSAL: A RIGHT FOR THE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER BUT NOT A REMEDY FOR THE 
DEFENDANT 
JOHN P. GROSS* 
INTRODUCTION 
Various arguments have been made to explain why public defenders 
continue to handle excessive caseloads: a lack of independence, 
organizational culture, or ethical blindness among them. All of these 
arguments are based on the idea that a public defender elects to labor under 
an excessive caseload either because they do not see it as excessive or 
because they realize it is but believe a refusal will lead to adverse 
consequences for themselves. In this essay, I argue that the decision to 
maintain an excessive caseload may not always be attributable to self-
interest on the part of the public defender, but can be motivated by a 
concern for the welfare of prospective clients. The possibility that case 
refusal will result in prospective clients receiving no representation, the 
poor quality of alternative counsel, and the lack of any meaningful remedy 
for defendants who are denied representation creates a situation where 
representation by a public defender with an excessive caseload can be seen 
as the defendant’s best option.   
I. PUBLIC DEFENDERS REFUSING TO TAKE NEW CASES 
In January 2016, the New Orleans Public Defender’s Office made the 
decision to refuse to handle certain serious felony charges due to their 
already excessive caseloads.1 Indigent defendants who were denied 
representation by the Public Defender’s Office were left without counsel 
and were relegated to a waitlist for legal representation.2 That prompted a 
federal lawsuit by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). The 
complaint filed by the ACLU alleges that defendants denied representation 
“have no access to an attorney for critical pretrial functions that would 
ordinarily be performed by defense counsel, such as conducting a 
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 1.  Ben Myers, Orleans Public Defender’s Office to Begin Refusing Serious Felony Cases 
Tuesday, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Jan. 11, 2016, 5:10 PM), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2016/01/ 
orleans_public_defenders_to_be.html. 
 2.  Id. 
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preliminary examination to challenge their arrests and bail conditions; 
investigating the allegations; filing motions to preserve potentially 
exculpatory evidence; or negotiating with the prosecution.”3  
The inability of the New Orleans Public Defender’s Office to provide 
adequate representation due to excessive caseloads is not a new 
development. Almost a quarter century ago, the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana found that caseloads were so excessive that they created a 
rebuttable presumption that indigent defendants in New Orleans were 
receiving ineffective assistance of counsel.4 In addition to New Orleans, 
public defenders in Nashville, Tennessee,5 and Hobbs, New Mexico,6 have 
recently begun refusing new cases because of excessive caseloads. Over 
the last few years, there has been litigation in Missouri7 and Florida8 over 
the right of public defenders to refuse new cases. Due to the chronic 
underfunding of indigent defense delivery systems, as well as the position 
of the American Bar Association (ABA) regarding the ethical duty of 
public defenders to avoid excessive caseloads, it is surprising that more 
public defenders across the country are not refusing to take new cases. 
II. THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S POSITION ON CASE REFUSAL 
The chronic underfunding of our nation’s indigent defense system has 
been well documented.9 The ABA’s response to this ongoing crisis has 
been to encourage public defenders to refuse new cases when their 
workload becomes excessive. Just over a decade ago, the ABA Committee 
 
 
 3.  Complaint at 2, Yarls v. Bunton, No. 3:16-cv-00031-JJB-RLB (M.D. La. Jan. 14, 2016), 
https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/yarls-v-bunton-complaint.  
 4.  State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 791 (La. 1993). 
 5.  Steven Hale, Buried Under Workload, Public Defender’s Office Pushes Back, NASHVILLE 
SCENE (Feb. 2, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.nashvillescene.com/news/cover-
story/article/20850716/facing-an-unmanageable-workload-the-public-defenders-office-is-now-
limiting-the-cases-it-takes.  
 6.  Phaedra Haywood, Judge Finds Cash-Strapped Chief Public Defender in Contempt, THE 
NEW MEXICAN (Nov. 29, 2016), available at 
http://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local_news/judge-finds-cash-strapped-chief-public-
defender-in-contempt/article_1384bdd6-397d-5e90-9962-9bc1399b12d1.html.  
 7.  See State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 8.  See Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261 (Fla. 2013). 
 9.  See AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S 
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_
def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf; NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF 
OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009), available at 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf; NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL 
DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR, CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN 
MISDEMEANOR COURTS (2009), available at https://www.nacdl.org/reports/misdemeanor/. 
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on Ethics and Professional Responsibility published a formal ethics 
opinion that made case refusal an ethical obligation for public defenders.10 
Noting that public defenders operate within systems “created to provide 
representation for a virtually unlimited number of indigent criminal 
defendants,”11 the opinion makes it clear that public defenders “have an 
ethical obligation to control their workloads so that every matter they 
undertake will be handled competently and diligently.”12 If a public 
defender “believes that her workload is such that she is unable to meet the 
basic ethical obligations required of her in the representation of a client 
[and] . . . if representation has not yet begun, she must decline the 
representation.”13  
In 2009, in order to provide additional guidance to public defenders 
considering case refusal, the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and 
Indigent Defendants published the “Eight Guidelines of Public Defense 
Related to Excessive Workloads.”14 Two years later, with the support of 
the Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, “Securing 
Reasonable Caseloads: Ethics and Law in Public Defense” was 
published.15 This treatise emphasizes the ethical duty of public defenders 
to avoid excessive caseloads, discusses the detrimental effects they have on 
the quality of representation, and suggests strategies for avoiding them and 
for designing indigent defense delivery systems where caseloads can be 
controlled.16 The ABA is not alone in its emphasis on the need to control 
public defender caseloads; one scholar described a public defender’s 
ethical duty to avoid excessive caseloads as the “Eleventh 
Commandment.”17   
 
 
 
 10.  STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, AM. BAR ASS’N, OPINION NO. 06-
441, ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS OF LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS WHEN 
EXCESSIVE CASELOADS INTERFERE WITH COMPETENT AND DILIGENT REPRESENTATION (2006), 
available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent 
_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_train_aba_ethics_on_excessive_caseloads.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 11.  Id. at 377. 
 12.  Id. at 384. 
 13.  Id. at 379. 
 14.  AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, EIGHT 
GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE RELATED TO EXCESSIVE CASELOADS (2009), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_
def_train_eight_guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 15.  NORMAN LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC 
DEFENSE (2011). 
 16.  Id. at 25–94, 229–268. 
 17.  Richard Klein, The Eleventh Commandment: Thou Shalt Not Be Compelled to Render the 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 68 IND. L.J. 363 (1993). 
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III. WHY DON’T MORE PUBLIC DEFENDERS REFUSE CASES? 
With the well-documented crisis in indigent defense and clear 
guidelines from the ABA on case refusal as a means to combat excessive 
caseloads, case refusal by public defenders should be a common 
occurrence. A recent report estimated that Louisiana’s indigent defense 
system only has the capacity to handle twenty-one percent of the annual 
workload, and that it would take an additional 1406 full-time-equivalent 
public defenders to provide reasonably effective assistance of counsel to 
defendants.18 Based on those estimates, one would expect to see case 
refusal in almost every parish, or county, in Louisiana. Yet case refusal 
remains the exception and not the norm for public defenders. 
A. Lack of Independence 
One reason case refusal may not occur is that many public defender 
offices lack independence, meaning that a refusal to accept cases could 
result in the termination or discipline of the lawyers involved.19 One 
example of this recently occurred in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, where 
the Chief Public Defender’s efforts to control caseloads led to his 
termination.20 Another example is New Mexico’s Chief Public Defender 
who was held in contempt for his office’s refusal to accept new cases.21  
B. Organizational Culture 
Organizational culture and, in particular, a lack of leadership have also 
been identified as factors that perpetuate the acceptance of excessive 
caseloads.22 A recently filed complaint by the ACLU details how internal 
 
 
18. POSTLETHWAITE & NETTERVILLE, & AM. BAR ASS’N THE LOUISIANA PROJECT: A STUDY OF 
THE LOUISIANA DEFENDER SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD STANDARDS 21 (2017), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_
louisiana_project_report.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 19.  See AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN 
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 2 (2002) (calling for the selection, funding, and 
payment of defense counsel to be independent from political influence), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_
def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 20.  Bill Wellock, Court Rules County Public Defender’s Office Case Can Move to Trial, THE 
CITIZENS’ VOICE (Sep. 29, 2016), available at http://citizensvoice.com/news/court-rules-county-
public-defender-s-office-case-can-move-to-trial-1.2097328. 
 21.  Haywood, supra note 6.  
 22.  See LEFSTEIN, supra note 15, at 95–112 (discussing the impact of social psychology, 
organizational culture, and the role of leadership on public defender behavior); see also Jonathan A. 
Rapping, You Can’t Build on Shaky Ground: Laying the Foundation for Indigent Defense Reform 
Through Values-Based Recruitment, Training and Mentoring, 3 HARV. L & POL’Y REV. 161 (2009) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss1/10
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policies in the Fresno County Public Defender’s Office have created an 
environment where individual attorneys feel as though they are not 
permitted to refuse cases.23 The complaint identifies an internal policy that 
prohibits attorneys from withdrawing from an existing case and prohibits 
them from refusing cases unless they obtain approval from the head of the 
office.24 While the complaint describes the office as being in a “state of 
crisis” since 2008,25 there appears to be only a single instance of 
widespread case refusal in 2010. However, that refusal did not occur 
because of a concern over the adequacy of the representation provided but 
because the public defenders could not physically staff all the 
courtrooms.26   
C. Ethical Blindness 
Another argument advanced to explain why case refusal does not occur 
more often is that public defenders suffer from a form of “ethical 
blindness.”27 This theory posits that while public defenders “may believe 
that they are engaged in representation that serves the best interests of their 
clients,” existing research on “the automatic preference for self-interest 
suggests that . . . [public defenders] may often fail to perceive the many 
ways in which their conduct does not comport with their professional 
duties.”28 Because chronic underfunding creates a “self-interested 
motivation to resolve cases quickly,” public defenders can be tricked “into 
believing that they are serving as effective advocates, even when they are 
not.”29  
A recent interview with public defenders from Colorado’s Ninth 
Judicial District offers a window into the thought process that can lead to 
ethical blindness.30 The head of the Public Defender’s Office “brushes off 
 
 
(arguing that recruitment, training, and mentoring can lead to the reform of the public defender 
system).   
 23.  Petition for Writ of Mandate & Complaint, Phillips v. State, No. 15 CE CG 2201 (Super. Ct. 
July 14, 2015), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/file_stamped_ 
phillips_v_state_of_california_complaint.pdf. 
 24.  Id. at 20–21. 
 25.  Id. at 1. 
 26.  Id. at 12. 
 27.  Tigran W. Eldred, Prescriptions for Ethical Blindness: Improving Advocacy for Indigent 
Defendants in Criminal Cases, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 333 (2012). 
 28.  Id. at 368. 
 29.  Id. at 394. 
 30.  Ryan Summerlin, Public Defenders Drawn to Mission, Not Money, GLENWOOD SPRINGS 
POST INDEPENDENT (Jan. 3, 2017), available http://www.postindependent.com/news/local/public-
defenders-drawn-to-mission-not-money/. 
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the insane workload as just part of the territory,” and claims that “public 
defenders are the best lawyers in court” “[b]ecause of the sheer amount of 
time they spend in the courtroom,” which enables them to become familiar 
with the arguments that will work in front of certain judges, and because of 
their relationship with the district attorneys.31 Excessive caseloads are not 
just normalized; they are seen as advantageous since they give public 
defenders more experience than other attorneys.     
D. Identification with Heroic Ideals 
An often-overlooked factor in the acceptance of excessive caseloads is 
how public defenders see themselves. Professor Charles Ogletree identified 
two factors, empathy and heroism, that motivated him when he worked as 
a public defender.32 In response to Professor Ogletree, Professor Abbe 
Smith, also a former public defender, suggested that public defenders 
needed to maintain “a sense of outrage about the inequality, injustice, and 
the routine abuse of power by those in a positon to wield it . . . .”33 
Professor Jonathan Rapping, the founder of Gideon’s Promise (an 
organization devoted to training and supporting public defenders) has also 
described public defenders as heroic.34 Some scholars have gone so far as 
to compare the decision to become a public defender to a religious 
calling.35 The National Association for Public Defense has this quotation 
from a public defender on its Facebook page: “I am a public defender. That 
isn’t a job description. That is my identity.”36 
Public defenders see themselves as a unique class of lawyers who are 
engaged in a heroic struggle against an unjust system. In this context, case 
refusal is seen as an admission that the system is winning. To the heroic 
warrior, the refusal to continue fighting is to surrender to the forces of evil. 
Derwyn Bunton, the Chief Public Defender for Orleans Parish, was asked 
in an interview how he was explaining to the families of those accused of 
crimes that they could not provide representation.37 His response typifies 
 
 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public 
Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1243 (1993). 
 33.  Abbe Smith, Too Much Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and Fractured Ego of 
the Empathic, Heroic Public Defender, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1203, 1208 (2004). 
 34.  Jonathan A. Rapping, Reclaiming Our Rightful Place: Reviving the Hero Image of the Public 
Defender, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1893 (2014). 
 35.  Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal Defense, 50 MERCER L. REV 
443 (1999). 
 36.  Nat’l Ass’n for Pub. Def., FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/nationalassociation 
forpublicdefense/ (quoting Memphis Public Defender Melody Dernocoeur). 
 37.  Interview by Audie Cornish with Derwyn Bunton, Chief Public Defender, Orleans Public 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss1/10
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the attitude of public defenders: “It is really difficult. The ethos in our 
office is to help folks. You don't become a public defender to turn cases 
away.”38    
E. The Best Interests of the Defendant 
A lack of independence, organizational culture, ethical blindness, and 
the perception of themselves as heroes are all factors that discourage public 
defenders from refusing cases. These factors all have one thing in 
common: they discourage case refusal because it is not in the best interest 
of the public defender. A lack of independence or an organizational culture 
that discourages case refusal creates an environment where a public 
defender may suffer adverse consequences if they refuse cases. Ethical 
blindness is rooted in an unconscious preference for one’s own self-
interest. The conscious identification of themselves as heroes leads public 
defenders to believe that they can handle excessive caseloads. In all of 
these cases, it is the public defender, either consciously or unconsciously, 
who chooses their own interests over those of the client.   
There is, however, another explanation for why some public defenders 
do not seek to refuse cases when they have excessive caseloads. This 
explanation places the interests of the client above those of the public 
defender. If refusing to represent a defendant will prejudice the defendant 
more than if the public defender represented that defendant, even while 
managing an excessive caseload, then it is in the defendant’s best interests 
to be represented by the public defender. This perverse incentive to 
continue representation, despite the recognition that a public defender’s 
caseload is excessive, is attributable to the lack of a remedy for a defendant 
who is denied counsel because of the unavailability of the public defender. 
IV. RIGHT FOR THE PUBLIC DEFENDER BUT NOT A REMEDY FOR THE 
DEFENDANT 
The Supreme Courts of Louisiana, Missouri, and Florida have all 
recognized that excessive caseloads create a situation where a public 
defender is presumptively providing ineffective assistance of counsel. 
These decisions make it possible for public defenders to comply with the 
ethical guidelines put forth by the ABA, but defendants who are not 
 
 
Defenders (Jan. 29, 2016, 4:29 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/01/29/464893246/new-orleans-public-
defenders-refuse-new-cases-to-highlight-underfunding 
 38.  Id. 
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represented by the public defender may find themselves without counsel or 
with counsel that is unqualified and has a financial incentive to devote as 
little time as possible to the case. These decisions have also failed to create 
the necessary incentives for state legislatures to adequately fund indigent 
defense delivery systems. The result is that being represented by a public 
defender with an excessive caseload may be a defendant’s best option.    
A. Louisiana 
In 1993, the Supreme Court of Louisiana decided two cases that dealt 
with Louisiana’s inadequately funded indigent defense system. In State v. 
Peart,39 the court found that the excessive caseloads of public defenders in 
New Orleans gave rise to a “rebuttable presumption” that indigent 
defendants “are receiving assistance of counsel not sufficiently effective to 
meet constitutionally required standards.”40 The court warned that if 
“legislative action is not forthcoming and indigent defense reform does not 
take place,” it might need to “employ the more intrusive and specific 
measures it has thus far avoided to ensure that indigent defendants receive 
reasonably effective assistance of counsel.”41 This rebuttable presumption 
of ineffective assistance of counsel was to be applied by trial judges who 
were instructed to “hold individual hearings” for each defendant.42 After 
“applying this presumption and weighing all evidence presented,” if the 
trial judge finds that a defendant was not receiving reasonably effective 
assistance, “then the court shall not permit the prosecution to go forward 
until the defendant is provided with reasonably effective assistance of 
counsel.”43    
In State v. Wigley,44 the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the practice of 
appointing members of the private bar to represent indigent criminal 
defendants, but found the State “must provide for reimbursement to the 
assigned attorney of properly incurred and reasonable out-of-pocket 
expenses and overhead costs.”45 As long as the amount of time the attorney 
needs to devote to the assigned case does not become unreasonable, “a fee 
for services need not be paid.”46 Before a trial judge can appoint counsel 
for an indigent defendant, the court must find “that funds sufficient to 
 
 
 39.  621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993). 
 40.  Id. at 791. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Id. at 791–92. 
 44.  624 So. 2d 425 (La. 1993). 
 45.  Id. at 429.  
 46.  Id. 
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cover the anticipated expenses and overhead are likely to be available to 
reimburse counsel . . . .”47 Trial courts were ordered not to “appoint 
members of the private bar to represent indigents” if the court determines 
funds are not available to reimburse them.48 The Louisiana Supreme Court 
acknowledged that “this solution may impair the functioning of the 
indigent defense system . . . . However, budget exigencies cannot serve as 
an excuse for the oppressive and abusive extension of attorneys’ 
professional responsibilities.”49  
Notably absent from the court’s analysis in Peart and Wigley is the 
direct effect that lack of counsel will have on defendants. While the court 
in Peart created a “rebuttable presumption that . . . indigents are not 
receiving assistance of counsel effective enough to meet constitutionally 
required standards,”50 they provide no remedy for indigents who are 
deprived of representation, other than to delay the prosecution of the case. 
Similarly, in Wigley, the court prohibits prosecutions from going forward if 
there are no funds to reimburse assigned counsel.51 However, one of the 
problems associated with excessive caseloads is the inability of public 
defenders to adequately investigate the charges. As the United States 
Supreme Court observed many years ago, “perhaps the most critical period 
of the proceedings” is “from the time of [the defendant’s] arraignment until 
the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thorough-going 
investigation and preparation [is] vitally important.”52 In Peart, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court based its decision, at least in part, on the fact that 
public defenders have too many cases to adequately investigate and 
prepare for trial,53 but its solution was to deprive the defendant of any 
representation during a critical stage of the case when investigation is 
“vitally important.”54 
From the perspective of a public defender in Louisiana, case refusal is 
not an appealing option because it only results in delay, which, at best, 
gives rise to a highly speculative future claim that there was a violation of 
the defendant’s right to a speedy trial. It can also result in the defendant 
 
 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Peart, 621 So. 2d at 791. 
 51.  Wigley, 624 So. 2d at 429. 
 52.  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932). 
 53.  Peart, 621 So. 2d at 789 (“Many indigent defendants . . . are provided with counsel who can 
perform only pro forma, especially at early stages of the proceedings. They are often subsequently 
provided with counsel who are so overburdened as to be effectively unqualified.”). 
 54.  Powell, 287 U.S. at 57.  
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being assigned counsel who has no experience with criminal defense and 
has a financial incentive to spend as little time as possible on the case since 
they are not entitled to a fee. In Concordia Parish, out of desperation, the 
Chief Public Defender offered a local attorney $1,000 for every 100 cases 
she accepted.55 In Caddo Parish, the court appointed every lawyer in the 
Parish, including those with no criminal defense experience whose 
practices focused on tax, real estate, and adoption, to cases that the public 
defender refused to take.56 As one Louisiana lawyer assigned to a criminal 
case admitted: “I wouldn’t want me representing me.”57 To a dedicated 
public defender in Louisiana, case refusal is a no-win situation. They can 
continue to soldier on and do the best they can, or they can refuse new 
cases and leave those clients at the mercy of unqualified and 
uncompensated assigned counsel.  
Nor have the halting of prosecutions authorized in Peart and Wigley 
created the necessary incentive for the Louisiana Legislature to act. As of 
2015, Louisiana had the nation’s highest rate of incarceration,58 and the 
New Orleans Public Defenders Office has had to resort to online 
crowdfunding campaigns to cover budget shortfalls.59  
B. Missouri 
In Missouri, the Public Defender Commission has an administrative 
rule that permits district defender offices to decline new appointments after 
exceeding caseload capacity for at least three consecutive calendar 
months.60 While this rule was upheld by the Supreme Court of Missouri in 
State ex rel. Missouri Public Defender Commission v. Waters,61 the court 
also made it clear that “the trial judge has authority over the public 
 
 
 55.  Dylan Walsh, On the Defensive, THE ATLANTIC, June 2, 2016, available at 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/on-the-defensive/485165/.  
 56.  Oliver Laughland, When the Money Runs out for Public Defense, What Happens Next?, THE 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 7, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/09/07/when-
the-money-runs-out-for-public-defense-what-happens-next#.cCI6eZoaz.  
 57.  Eli Hager, Louisiana Public Defenders: A Lawyer with a Pulse Will Do, THE GUARDIAN 
Sept. 8, 2016, available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/08/louisiana-public-
defender-crisis.  
 58.  DANIELLE KAEBLE & LAUREN GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL 
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015 12 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/cpus15.pdf.  
 59.  Crowdfunding Campaign Reaches $25,000, ORLEANS PUB. DEFS., 
http://www.opdla.org/defense-matters-archive/listid-3/mailid-31-crowdfunding-campaign-reaches-25-
000 (last visited Mar. 1, 2017).  
 60.  MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 18, § 10-4.010 (2015); State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. 
Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870 (Mo. 2009) (en banc). 
 61.  370 S.W.3d 592 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
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defender’s caseload that the public defender itself does not.”62 The solution 
to excessive caseloads proposed by the Supreme Court of Missouri is 
“triage” by the trial court where the public defender is only appointed to 
cases “alleging the most serious offenses, those in which defendants are 
unable to seek or obtain bail, and those that for other reasons need to be 
given priority . . . .”63  
In addition to “triage,” the court also suggests that “the judge, 
prosecutor, public defender and, where appropriate, the local bar 
associations work together” and use “creative mechanisms” to avoid 
excessive caseloads in the future.64 The court acknowledges that the use of 
these unidentified “creative mechanisms” comes with potential costs, such 
as the “delayed prosecution of cases,” which could result in “a delay in the 
imposition of punishment on those later found guilty, a delay in providing 
justice for those who are victims of crime and a delay in acquittal for those 
who ultimately are found not guilty.”65 These delays may also “result in 
the release of some offenders because of a violation of their rights to a 
speedy trial . . . .”66 Absent from the court’s decision, however, is any 
suggestion that the denial of a defendant’s fundamental right to counsel 
will result in a dismissal of the charges pending against them.  
Just as in Louisiana, the Missouri Supreme Court gives the public 
defender the right to refuse cases, but no remedy to those defendants who 
are refused representation. The court suggests that the public defender 
“meet with the court and prosecutors to determine categories of cases in 
which representation by public defenders is not mandated constitutionally 
or in which the lack of such representation would have less egregious 
consequences . . . . [A]t least until such time as the public defender office 
is funded adequately.”67 This sort of “triage” has been condemned by 
scholars of legal ethics, including Monroe Freedman, who felt that the 
“promotion of triage encourages public defenders to prostitute the ideal of 
Gideon v. Wainwright.”68  
 
 
 62.  Id. at 611. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 612. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. at 610. 
68. Monroe H. Freedman, An Ethical Manifesto for Public Defenders, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 911, 
918 (2005). See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, (1963) (“From the very beginning, our 
state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive 
safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands 
equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to 
face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.”) 
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The Court’s suggestion that “triage” will only be necessary until the 
public defender office is adequately funded also ignores Missouri’s history 
of underfunding indigent defense. An assessment of the Missouri State 
Public Defender System (MSPD) in 2009 documented a decade of 
underfunding.69 That study found that:  
MSPD is confronting an overwhelming caseload crisis, one of the 
worst of its kind in the nation–a crisis so serious that it has pushed 
the entire criminal justice system in Missouri to the brink of 
collapse. The severity of this crisis has been forecasted [sic] for 
years, by those closest to it, but next to nothing has been done. And 
now the situation is as urgent as it is dire.70  
In an effort to call attention to the caseload crisis, the head of the Missouri 
Public Defender’s Office recently tried to use his statutory authority to 
appoint the Governor to represent an indigent defendant.71 
C. Florida 
In Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida v. State,72 the 
Supreme Court of Florida upheld the right of a public defender to 
withdraw from cases. The court noted that, as a result of the public 
defender’s excessive caseload, “[c]lients who are not in custody are 
essentially unrepresented for long periods between arraignment and trial” 
and that the public defenders engage “in ‘triage’ with the clients who are in 
custody or who face the most serious charges getting priority to the 
detriment of the other clients.”73 In Florida, if the public defender is unable 
to represent an indigent defendant because of a conflict of interest, the trial 
court can appoint the regional conflict counsel74 or a private attorney.75 As 
in most states, private attorneys who are assigned to represent indigent 
defendants are typically paid low hourly rates that come with a cap on 
 
 
 69.  See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP & CTR. FOR JUST., LAW, AND SOC’Y AT GEORGE 
MASON U., ASSESSMENT OF THE MISSOURI STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM (2009), 
http://www.nlada.net/sites/default/files/2009%20Assessment%20of%20the%20Missouri%20State%20
Public%20Defender%20System%20(TSG).pdf.  
 70.  Id. at 64. 
 71.  Matt Ford, A Governor Ordered to Serve as a Public Defender, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 
2016, 10:56 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/when-the-governor-is-your 
lawyer/494453/. 
 72.  115 So. 3d 261 (Fla. 2013). 
 73.  Id. at 274. 
74.  See FLA. STAT. § 27.511(5) (2008); Johnson v. State, 78 So. 3d 1305, 1309 (Fla. 2012). 
75.  See FLA. STAT. § 27.40(2) (2008); Escambia Cty. v. Behr, 384 So. 2d 147, 150 (Fla. 1980) 
(“We hold that the court has the option of appointing the public defender or private counsel. This is a 
matter within the sound discretion of the trial court judge.”).  
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compensation.76 
As the court notes, there is “a long line of cases involving attorney 
compensation as it relates to safeguarding a defendant’s right to effective 
representation” in Florida.77 The reason that “long line of cases” exists is 
because the Florida Legislature has repeatedly passed laws limiting the 
compensation paid to assigned counsel in criminal cases. The Florida 
Supreme Court first held such statutes to be unconstitutional as applied 
over thirty years ago,78 but that fact has not diminished the legislature’s 
enthusiasm for them as a way to control the costs associated with indigent 
defense. The year before the decision in Public Defender, Eleventh 
Judicial Circuit of Florida v. State, the legislature once again set limits on 
the compensation of assigned counsel in criminal cases to levels below the 
minimum wage.79 In light of this longstanding hostility toward funding 
indigent defense, a public defender handling an excessive caseload might 
conclude that he or she is still a defendant’s best option.  
D. The United States Supreme Court 
Just prior to the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Public Defender, 
Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida. v. State, the United States Supreme 
Court had the opportunity to send a message to states like Florida, 
Missouri, and Louisiana whose underfunding of indigent defense resulted 
in the absence of conflict-free counsel for indigent defendants. In Boyer v. 
Louisiana,80 the Court granted certiorari in a case where the defendant’s 
trial was delayed for seven years because of a lack of funding for defense 
counsel, but then dismissed the writ as improvidently granted.81 In her 
dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor argues that delays caused by a 
state’s refusal to fund counsel for indigent defendants should weigh against 
the state in determining whether there was a deprivation of a defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.82 The Court could have sent a 
 
 
76.  See JOHN P. GROSS, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, RATIONING JUSTICE: THE 
UNDERFUNDING OF ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS 8 (2013), https://www.nacdl.org/reports/ 
gideonat50/rationingjustice/ (finding that the average national compensation rate to attorneys handling 
felony cases was less than $65 per hour). 
 77.  See Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Fla., 115 So. 3d at 272. 
 78.  See Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1112 (Fla. 1986). 
 79.  David Carroll, Florida Institutes a “Dangerous Game of Chance” in Conflict 
Representation, SIXTH AMEND. CTR.: PLEADING THE SIXTH (July 23, 2012), http://sixthamendment. 
org/florida-institutes-a-dangerous-game-of-chance-in-conflict-representation/.  
 80.  133 S. Ct. 1702 (2013) (per curiam). 
 81.  Id. at 1703 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 82.  Id. at 1707 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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clear message that delays caused by a lack of funding for defense counsel 
should always be viewed as prejudicial to a defendant’s right to speedy 
trial, but instead the Court relies on the ad hoc balancing test it required in 
Barker v. Wingo.83 Courts must consider the “[l]ength of delay, the reason 
for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the 
defendant.”84 
E. The Defendant’s Best Option 
While case refusal provides a benefit to the public defender in terms of 
a reduced caseload, that personal benefit may seem less appealing because 
of the consequences case refusal has on potential clients. Since most public 
defenders see themselves as representing an entire class of defendants, not 
individual clients, the impact of case refusal on prospective clients is a 
factor that will impact a decision to refuse new cases. If public defenders 
believe that by refusing cases prospective clients would be worse off, then 
they will continue to accept new cases even if they have excessive 
caseloads that limit the quality of the representation they can provide.  
Courts have given public defenders the right to refuse cases, but they 
have not made the decision to invoke that right an easy one. The 
prohibition on cases going forward when counsel is unavailable may result 
in lengthy pretrial detention for some defendants, and it forecloses the 
possibility of a prompt investigation by defense counsel. The thought that 
potential clients will sit in jail needlessly and that evidence proving their 
innocence might be lost does not encourage public defenders to refuse 
cases. The only advantage refusing the case confers on the defendant is a 
speculative claim that the delay in prosecution will violate their right to a 
speedy trial. Even if all the public defender can provide is “triage,” it is 
arguably better than the total absence of representation.  
The prospect of lawyers who have little experience in criminal law or 
who have financial incentives to resolve cases as quickly as possible being 
assigned to represent indigent defendants also discourages public 
defenders from refusing cases. A public defender with an excessive 
caseload may have a better chance of providing adequate representation 
than a private attorney who has been given a three hour “Do’s and Don’t’s 
[sic] of Providing Effective Assistance” in criminal cases presentation, 
which is exactly the situation facing defendants in Caddo Parish, 
Louisiana.85  
 
 
 83.  407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
 84.  Id. at 530. 
 85.  Eli Hager, Louisiana Public Defenders: A Lawyer with a Pulse Will Do, THE GUARDIAN 
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V. THE RELUCTANCE TO GIVE DEFENDANTS A REMEDY 
The reluctance of courts to give indigent defendants a more concrete 
remedy when they are denied counsel is understandable. There is a 
legitimate separation of powers issue that influenced the decision of the 
Louisiana Supreme Court in Peart.86 The ACLU’s lawsuit alleging a 
systemic failure to adequately fund indigent defense in Orleans Parish was 
recently dismissed due to similar concerns.87 Still, there have been 
instances where courts have ordered an increase in compensation rates to 
assigned counsel because the failure to adequately compensate them was 
impairing the ability of the court to function.88 
The biggest factor discouraging courts from imposing a more drastic 
remedy, such as the dismissal of cases when defendants are unrepresented, 
is the fear that the guilty will go free. As one judge in rural Winn Parish, 
Louisiana said:  
I’m not going to be the one that lets one of them out, unless a higher 
court tells me I must . . . What I’m scared of is some serious 
offender who is guilty ending up walking down our streets because 
of this . . . All I can do is find a lawyer to agree to do it, or else 
these suckers are fixing to be home free.89  
The potential release of defendants charged with violent crimes in New 
Orleans even prompted one prosecutor to argue that doing so would result 
in “nothing less than anarchy.”90     
In light of the chronic underfunding of our nation’s indigent defense 
systems and the excessive caseloads that result, giving public defenders the 
right to refuse cases is not enough. Courts need to be aware that the lack of 
 
 
(Sept. 8, 2016), available at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/08/louisiana-public-
defender-crisis. 
 86.  See Peart, 621 So. 2d at 791 (“We decline at this time to undertake these more intrusive and 
specific measures because this Court should not lightly tread in the affairs of other branches of 
government and because the legislature ought to assess such measures in the first instance.”). 
 87.  Ken Daley, Federal Judge Dismisses ACLU Lawsuit Aimed at Boosting New Orleans 
Indigent Defense Funding, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 1, 2017, available at http://www.nola. 
com/crime/index.ssf/ 2017/02/federal_judge_dismisses_aclu_l.html.  
 88.  See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1164 (Okla. 1990); State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 
617 S.W.2d 64, 67–68 (Mo. 1981); N.Y. Cty. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. State, 763 N.Y.S.2d 397, 409 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2003); New York County Lawyers’ Ass’n v. State, 745 N.Y.S.2d 376, 386 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2002). 
 89.  Hager, supra note 85.  
 90.  John Simerman, Suck It Up: That’s Orleans DA Office’s Message to Private Attorneys 
Seeking Release of Indigent Clients for Lack of Funds, THE NEW ORLEANS ADVOC. (Apr. 4, 2016, 
1:49 PM), http://www.theadvocate.com/new_orleans/news/article_96b0911a-ef79-5d1b-a523-d385ac2 
e4204.html. 
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a remedy for a defendant who is denied counsel creates a perverse 
incentive for public defenders to try to manage excessive caseloads instead 
of refusing additional cases. The public defender’s refusal needs to trigger 
something more than a delay in the proceedings or the drafting of a private 
attorney with no criminal defense experience. If courts were willing to 
release defendants or dismiss cases when public defenders refused them 
because of excessive caseloads, it would give those public defenders the 
ability to, as one scholar has put it, “crash the system.”91   
 Courts need to give defendants who are denied representation a remedy 
that will motivate legislatures to provide adequate funding for indigent 
defense. Until courts are willing to dismiss cases when counsel is not 
available due to a lack of funding, legislators will continue to underfund 
indigent defense, and public defenders will suffer from excessive caseloads 
in silence.     
 
 
 91.  See Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1100 
n.44 (2013). 
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